THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW
the Bulk Sales Law did not apply to a transaction not involving merchandise, but concerned fixtures, utensils, and a horse and wagon used by the vendor in his butcher shop.
Although the decisions of other courts mean little since the Illinois statute is worded
more broadly than those of other states, Montgomery, Bulk Sales (2d ed. 1926), 26-27,
the last two decisions accord with the weight of authority. McPartinv. Clarkson, 240
Mich. 390, 215 N.W. 338, 54 A.L.R. 1535 (1927); Swift & Co. v. Tempelos, [78 N.C.
487, io S.E. 8, 7 A.L.R. 1581 (igxg). But it has been definitely settled that the Illinois
Bulk Sales Law has broader application than that given the statute in other states.
Weskaldies v. HesternIan, 288 Ill. i99, 123 N.E. 314, 4 A.L.R. i28 (I919) (sale by dairy
farmer of his livestock, agricultural, and other implements); La Salle Opera House Co.
v. La Salle Amusement Co.., 289 Ill. 194, 124 N.E. 454 (1919) (sale by opera house company of lease, furniture, fixtures, etc., together with good will, trade mark, and trade
names).
In the La Salle case the court did not discuss the question whether or not intangible
property was covered by the statute. But the Illinois act has been applied where a
debtor assigned accounts, bills receivable, and other evidences of indebtedness for the
benefit of creditors. Danville Auburn Auto Co. v. National Trust & Credit Co., 212 I.
App. ii6 (i9i8). See Hershberger, Illinois Bulk Sales Law and Assignments for Benefit
of Creditors, 21 Ill. L. Rev. 153 (1926). The transfer of the assets of one doing business
as a partner has also been held to be within the act. National Trust & Credit Co. v.
Kiminghant, 2oi Ill. App. 78 (1905); Marlow v. Ringer, 79 W.Va. 568, 9i S.E. 386,
L.R.A. 1g7D 623 (1917); contra Schoeppel v. Pfannensteil, 122 Kan. 630, 253 Pac.

567, 51 A.L.R. 398 (1927). However, in a well reasoned opinion the transfer of assets
to a successor bank has been held outside the scope of the Illinois Bulk Sales Law:
first, because under the rule of ejusden generis the words "other goods and chattels of
the vendor's business" refer to tangible personal property; second, because the opinion
in Off & Co. v. Morehead, supra,in holding the act of 1905 discriminatory, referred only
to other kinds of tangible personalty; and third, because other jurisdictions do not
apply the act to transfers of intangible personalty. People ex rel. Nelson v. Sherrard
State Bank, 258 Ill. App. i68 (1930). Decisions of other courts exempt intangible personalty, except in the transfer of a partner's interest. Starr Piano Co. v. Sammak, 235
N.Y. 566, 139 N.E. 737 (1923); Rio Tire Co. v. Spectralite, 48 S.W. (2d) 367 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1932). It would seem that the principal case is rightly decided on this point.
HUBERT C. MERRcIK

Conflict of Laws-Law Governing Performance of a Covenant to Pay Rent[Federal] .- L, in Chicago, signed and mailed to T, a Maryland corporation, a lease to
a store located in Chicago. T signed the lease in Maryland. In a subsequent bankruptcy proceeding in Maryland it was held that the question of apportionability of rent
is to be determined by the law of Maryland, the lex loci contractus. In re Newark Shoe
Stores, 2 F. Supp. 384 (D.C.D.Md. 1933).

The court relied upon a recent Circuit Court of Appeals case, In re Barnett, 12 F.
(2d) 73, (C.C.A. 2d 1926) in which the court said that the obligation to pay rent is an

independent covenant and the law of the place of contract will govern what is sufficient
performance.
In the Barnett case the court recognized that a lease is in some respects a convey-

RECENT CASES
ance of an interest in land and in other respects a contract. It also recognized that the
conveyancing provisions will be governed by the lex situs, but insisted that the contractual provisions should be governed by the lex loci contractus. The difficulty in the
use of this approach is in determining when a covenant is contractual and when it is a
conveyancing covenant. But this difficulty, fortunately, need not detain us, for having
recognized the bifurcation intended by the court, we need only ask into which class a
covenant to pay rent falls.
A lease as a conveyance of an estate in land results in two estates: the lessee's
possessory estate and the lessor's reversion. The rent reserved is an incident to the reversion and is definitely considered an interest in the land; it "issues out of the land."
In the familiar but almost meaningless language of Spencer's Case, 5 Co. i6a (1583), it
"touches or concerns the thing demised" and is not "merely collateral to the land."
Or, as another English court put it, a rent-charge is "as much real estate as if, instead
of a rent-charge issuing out of the land, land itself to the value of the annual rentcharge had been given." Chatfield v. Berchtoldt, L. R. 7 Ch. 192 (1872). Bigelow, The
Content of Covenant of Leases, 12 Mich. L. Rev. 639, 657, 658 (1914), puts a covenant
to pay rent into a group of covenants "that merely repeat in terms of a contract an already existing obligation running from the covenantor to the convenantee." In determining the liability under a covenant "to pay the rent reserved," it will be necessary to
solve the property question, "What rent is due?" The lex situs will determine whether
all or only a proportion of the monthly rent will issue out of the land; the liability under
the covenant is to pay that amount.
The court cites, and is to a degree misled by, cases like Polson v. Stewart, 167 Mass.
211, 45 N.E. 737 (1897) and Atwood v. Walker, 179 Mass. 514, 61 N.E. 58 (19Oi).
These cases are not in point as they deal with contracts to convey and not conveyances.
The true analogy to these cases would be a contract to lease and it is admitted that the
validity of this, as any other contract, would be settled by the lex loci contractus. In the
principal case, and in the Barnett case which is relied upon, the documents in litigation
were leases, not contracts for leases.
And, finally, the assumed rule, of conflict of laws dividing the leases into property
and contract provisions, may be attacked by the argument of convenience: it is better
to have a more uniform construction of an instrument conveying an interest in land,
and as the law of the situs is necessarily applicable to part, it should apply to the whole
of the instrument.
BEN GRODSKY

Constitutional Law-Revocation of Extradition Warrant-Mandatory Injunction[Federal].-One De Grazier of Illinois was held in custody by the defendant sheriff awaiting extradition to Illinois where De Grazier was wanted for the commission
of an extraditable offense. When plaintiff messenger from Illinois appeared to receive
De Grazier, defendant refused to turn him over on the ground that the original extradition warrant had been revoked by the Governor of Texas. The Governor assigned as
reason for the revocation "that the prosecution of the defendant in the case was for
the sole purpose of collecting a civil debt." Held, mandatory injunction would not lie to
compel surrender of prisoner to plaintiff. Downey v. Schmidt, 4 F. Supp. i (N.D. Texas,
1933).
As between component parts of a domestic system the term renditionseems more apt

